�It was 12 years ago, on March 14, 1983, that the commandant of
�the Marine Corps sent a highly unusual letter to the secretary of
�defense expressing frustration and anger at Israel. General R.H.
�Barrow charged that Israeli troops were deliberately threatening
�the lives of Marines serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. There
�was, he wrote, a systematic pattern of harassment by Israel
�Defense Forces (IDF) that was resulting in "life‑threatening
�situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their
�uniform and country."
�Barrow's letter added: "It is inconceivable to me why Americans
�serving in peacekeeping roles must be harassed, endangered
�by an ally...It is evident to me, and the opinion of the U.S.
�commanders afloat and ashore, that the incidents between the
�Marines and the IDF are timed, orchestrated, and executed for
�obtuse Israeli political purposes."1
�Israel's motives were less obtuse than the diplomatic general
�pretended. It was widely believed then, and now, that Israeli
�Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most
�Machiavellian politician‑generals, was creating the incidents
�deliberately in an effort to convince Washington that the two
�forces had to coordinate their actions in order to avoid such
�tensions. This, of course, would have been taken by the Arabs as
�proof that the Marines were not really in Lebanon as neutral
�peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis, a perception that
�would have obvious advantages for Israel.2
�Barrow's extraordinary letter was indicative of the frustrations
�and miseries the Marines suffered during their posting to
�Lebanon starting on Aug. 25, 1982, as a result of Israel's
�invasion 11 weeks earlier. Initially a U.S. unit of 800 men was
�sent to Beirut harbor as part of a multinational force to monitor
�the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. The Marines,
�President Reagan announced, "in no case... would stay longer
�than 30 days."3 This turned out to be only partly true. They did
�withdraw on Sept. 10, but a reinforced unit of 1,200 was rushed
�back 15 days later after the massacres at the Palestinian
�refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila that accompanied the
�Israeli seizure of West Beirut. The U.S. forces remained until
�Feb. 26, 1984.4
�During their‑year‑and‑a‑half posting in Lebanon, the Marines
�suffered 268 killed.5 The casualties started within a week of the
�return of the Marines in September 1982. On the 30th, a
�U.S.‑made cluster bomb left behind by the Israelis exploded,
�killing Corporal David Reagan and wounding three other
�Marines.6
�Corporal Reagan's death represented the dangers of the new
�mission of the Marines in Lebanon. While their first brief stay had
�been to separate Israeli forces from Palestinian fighters
�evacuating West Beirut, their new mission was as part of a
�multinational force sent to prevent Israeli troops from attacking
�the Palestinian civilians left defenseless there after the
�withdrawal of PLO forces. As President Reagan said: "For this
�multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw
�from Beirut."7
�"Incidents are timed, orchestrated, and
�executed for Israeli political purposes."
�Israel's siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982 had been
�brutal and bloody, reaching a peak of horror on Aug. 12, quickly
�known as Black Thursday. On that day, Sharon's forces launched
�at dawn a massive artillery barrage that lasted for 11 straight
�hours and was accompanied by saturation air bombardment.8
�As many as 500 persons, mainly Lebanese and Palestinian
�civilians, were killed.9
�On top of the bombardment came the massacres the next month
�at Sabra and Shatila, where Sharon's troops allowed Lebanese
�Maronite killers to enter the camps filled with defenseless
�civilians. The massacres sickened the international community
�and pressure from Western capitals finally forced Israel to
�withdraw from Beirut in late September. Troops from Britain,
�France, Italy and the United States were interposed between the
�Israeli army and Beirut, with U.S. Marines deployed in the most
�sensitive area south of Beirut at the International Airport, directly
�between Israeli troops and West Beirut.
�It was at the airport that the Marines would suffer their Calvary
�over the next year. Starting in January 1983, small Israeli units
�began probing the Marine lines. At first the effort appeared
�aimed at discovering the extent of Marine determination to resist
�penetration. The lines proved solid and the Marines'
�determination strong. Israeli troops were politely but firmly turned
�away. Soon the incidents escalated, with both sides pointing
�loaded weapons at each other but no firing taking place.
�Tensions were high enough by late January that a special
�meeting between U.S. and Israeli officers was held in Beirut to try
�to agree on precise boundaries beyond which the IDF would not
�penetrate.10
�No Stranger to the Marines
�However, on Feb. 2 a unit of three Israeli tanks, led by Israeli Lt.
�Col. Rafi Landsberg, tried to pass through Marine/Lebanese
�Army lines at Rayan University Library in south Lebanon. By this
�time, Landsberg was no stranger to the Marines. Since the
�beginning of January he had been leading small Israeli units in
�probes against the Marine lines, although such units would
�normally have a commander no higher than a sergeant or
�lieutenant. The suspicion grew that Sharon's troops were
�deliberately provoking the Marines and Landsberg was there to
�see that things did not get out of hand. The Israeli tactics were
�aimed more at forcing a joint U.S.‑Israeli strategy than merely
�probing lines.
�In the Feb. 2 incident, the checkpoint was commanded by Marine
�Capt. Charles Johnson, who firmly refused permission for
�Landsberg to advance. When two of the Israeli tanks ignored his
�warning to halt, Johnson leaped on Landsberg's tank with pistol
�drawn and demanded Landsberg and his tanks withdraw. They
�did.11
�Landsberg and the Israeli embassy in Washington tried to laugh
�off the incident, implying that Johnson was a trigger‑happy John
�Wayne type and that the media were exaggerating a routine
�event. Landsberg even went so far as to claim that he smelled
�alcohol on Johnson's breath and that drunkenness must have
�clouded his reason. Marines were infuriated because Johnson
�was well known as a teetotaler. Americans flocked to Johnson's
�side. He received hundreds of letters from school children,
�former Marines and from Commandant Barrow.12 It was a losing
�battle for the Israelis and Landsberg soon dropped from sight.
�But the incidents did not stop. These now included "helicopter
�harassment," by which U.S.‑made helicopters with glaring
�spotlights were flown by the Israelis over Marine positions at
�night, illuminating Marine outposts and exposing them to
�potential attack. As reports of these incidents piled up, Gen.
�Barrow received a letter on March 12 from a U.S. Army major
�stationed in Lebanon with the United Nations Truce Supervisory
�Organization (UNTSO). The letter described a systematic pattern
�of Israeli attacks and provocations against UNTSO troops,
�including instances in which U.S. officers were singled out for
�"near‑miss" shootings, abuse and detention.13 That same day
�two Marine patrols were challenged and cursed by Israeli
�soldiers.14
�Two days later Barrow wrote his letter to Secretary of Defense
�Caspar W. Weinberger, who endorsed it and sent it along to the
�State Department. High‑level meetings were arranged and the
�incidents abated, perhaps largely because by this time Ariel
�Sharon had been fired as defense minister. He had been found
�by an Israeli commission to have had "personal responsibility"
�for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.15
�Despite the bad taste left from the clashes with the Israelis, in
�fact no Marines had been killed in the incidents and their lines
�had been secure up to the end of winter in 1983. Then Islamic
�guerrillas, backed by Iran, became active. On the night of April
�17, 1983, an unknown sniper fired a shot that went through the
�trousers of a Marine sentry but did not harm him. For the first
�time, the Marines returned fire.16
�The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up by a
�massive bomb, with the loss of 63 lives. Among the 17
�Americans killed were CIA Mideast specialists, including Robert
�C. Ames, the agency's top Middle East expert.17 Disaffected
�former Israeli Mossad case officer Victor Ostrovsky later claimed
�that Israel had advance information about the bombing plan but
�had decided not to inform the United States, a claim denied by
�Israel.18 The Iranian‑backed Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
�Veteran correspondent John Cooley considered the attack "the
�day [Iranian leader Ayatollah] Khomeini's offensive against
�America in Lebanon began in earnest." 19
�Still, it was not until four months later, on Aug. 28, that Marines
�came under direct fire by rocket‑propelled grenades and
�automatic weapons at International Airport. They returned fire
�with M‑16 rifles and M‑60 machine guns. The firefight resumed
�the next day with Marines firing 155mm artillery, 81mm mortars
�and rockets from Cobra helicopter gunships against Shi'i Muslim
�positions. Two Marines were killed and 14 wounded in the
�exchange, the first casualties in actual combat since the Marines
�had landed the previous year.20
�From this time on, the combat involvement of the Marines grew.
�Their actions were generally seen as siding with Israel against
�Muslims, slowly changing the status of the Marines as neutral
�peacekeepers to opponents of the Muslims.21 Israel could hardly
�have wished for more. The polarization meant that increasingly
�the conflict was being perceived in terms of the U.S., Israel and
�Lebanon's Christians against Iran, Islam and Lebanon's Shi'i
�Muslims.
�Accelerating the Conflict
�Israel accelerated the building conflict on Sept. 3, 1993 by
�unilaterally withdrawing its troops southward, leaving the Marines
�exposed behind their thin lines at the airport. The United States
�had asked the Israeli government to delay its withdrawal until the
�Marines could be replaced by units of the Lebanese army, but
�Israel refused.22 The result was as feared. Heavy fighting
�immediately broke out between the Christian Lebanese Forces
�and the pro‑Syrian Druze units, both seeking to occupy positions
�evacuated by Israel, while the Marines were left in the crossfire.
�23On Sept. 5, two Marines were killed and three wounded as
�fighting escalated between Christian and Muslim militias.24
�In an ill‑considered effort to subdue the combat, the Sixth Fleet
�frigate Bowen fired several five‑inch naval guns, hitting Druze
�artillery positions in the Chouf Mountains that were firing into the
�Marine compound at Beirut airport.25 It was the first time U.S.
�ships had fired into Lebanon, dramatically raising the level of
�combat. But the Marines' exposed location on the flat terrain of
�the airport left them in an impossible position. On Sept. 12, three
�more Marines were wounded. 26
�On Sept. 13, President Reagan authorized what was called
�aggressive self‑defense for the Marines, including air and naval
�strikes.27 Five days later the United States essentially joined the
�war against the Muslims when four U.S. warships unleashed the
�heaviest naval bombardment since Vietnam into Syrian and
�Druze positions in eastern Lebanon in support of the Lebanese
�Christians.28 The bombardment lasted for three days and was
�personally ordered by National Security Council director Robert
�McFarlane, a Marine Corps officer detailed to the White House
�who was in Lebanon at the time and was also a strong supporter
�of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite Christian allies. McFarlane
�issued the order despite the fact that the Marine commander at
�the airport, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, strenuously argued
�against it because, in the words of correspondent Thomas L.
�Friedman, "he knew that it would make his soldiers party to what
�was now clearly an intra‑Lebanese fight, and that the Lebanese
�Muslims would not retaliate against the Navy's ships at sea but
�against the Marines on shore." 29
�By now, the Marines were under daily attack and Muslims were
�charging they were no longer neutral.30 At the same time the
�battleship USS New Jersey, with 16‑inch guns, arrived off
�Lebanon, increasing the number of U.S. warships offshore to 14.
�Similarly, the Marine contingent at Beirut airport was increased
�from 1,200 to 1,600.31
�A Tragic Climax
�The fight now was truly joined between the Shi'i Muslims and the
�Marines, who were essentially pinned down in their airport
�bunkers and under orders not to take offensive actions. The
�tragic climax of their predicament came on Oct. 23, when a
�Muslim guerrilla drove a truck past guards at the Marine airport
�compound and detonated an explosive with the force of 12,000
�pounds of dynamite under a building housing Marines and other
�U.S. personnel. Almost simultaneously, a car‑bomb exploded at
�the French compound in Beirut. Casualties were 241 Americans
�and 58 French troops killed. The bombings were the work of
�Hezbollah, made up of Shi'i Muslim guerrillas supported by
�Iran.32
�America's agony increased on Dec. 3, when two carrier planes
�were downed by Syrian missiles during heavy U.S. air raids on
�eastern Lebanon.33On the same day, eight Marines were killed
�in fighting with Muslim militiamen around the Beirut airport.34
�By the start of 1984, an all‑out Shi'i Muslim campaign to rid
�Lebanon of all Americans was underway. The highly respected
�president of the American University of Beirut, Dr. Malcolm Kerr,
�a distinguished scholar of the Arab world, was gunned down on
�Jan. 18 outside his office by Islamic militants aligned with Iran.35
�On Feb. 5, Reagan made one of his stand‑tall speeches by
�saying that "the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and
�dangerous. But this is no reason to turn our backs on friends and
�to cut and run."36
�The next day Professor Frank Regier, a U.S. citizen teaching at
�AUB, was kidnapped by Muslim radicals.37 Regier's kidnapping
�was the beginning of a series of kidnappings of Americans in
�Beirut that would hound the Reagan and later the Bush
�administrations for years and lead to the eventual expulsion of
�nearly all Americans from Lebanon where they had prospered for
�more than a century. Even today Americans still are prohibited
�from traveling to Lebanon.
�The day after Regier's kidnapping, on Feb. 7, 1984, Reagan
�suddenly reversed himself and announced that all U.S. Marines
�would shortly be "redeployed." The next day the battleship USS
�New Jersey fired 290 rounds of one‑ton shells from its 16‑inch
�guns into Lebanon as a final act of U.S. frustration.38 Reagan's
�"redeployment" was completed by Feb. 26, when the last of the
�Marines retreated from Lebanon.
�The mission of the Marines had been a humiliating failure�not
�because they failed in their duty but because the political
�backbone in Washington was lacking. The Marines had arrived
�in 1982 with all sides welcoming them. They left in 1984
�despised by many and the object of attacks by Muslims. Even
�relations with Israel were strained, if not in Washington where a
�sympathetic Congress granted increased aid to the Jewish state
�to compensate it for the costs of its bungled invasion, then
�between the Marines and Israeli troops who had confronted each
�other in a realpolitik battlefield that was beyond their competence
�or understanding. The Marine experience in Lebanon did not
�contribute toward a favorable impression of Israel among many
�Americans, especially since the Marines would not have been in
�Lebanon except for Israel's unprovoked invasion.
�This negative result is perhaps one reason a number of Israelis
�and their supporters today oppose sending U.S. peacekeepers
�to the Golan Heights as part of a possible Israeli‑Syrian peace
�treaty. A repeat of the 1982‑84 experience would certainly not be
�in Israel's interests at a time when its supporters are seeking to
�have a budget‑conscious Congress continue unprecedented
�amounts of aid to Israel.
�RECOMMENDED READING:
�Ball, George, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, Washington, DC,
�Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984.
�*Cockburn, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison:
�The Inside Story of the U.S.‑Israeli Covert Relationship, New
�York, Harper Collins, 1991.
�Cooley, John K., Payback: America's Long War in the Middle
�East , New York, Brassey's U.S., Inc., 1991.
�*Findley, Paul, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts About
�the U.S.‑Israeli Relationship, Brooklyn, NY, Lawrence Hill
�Books, 1993.
�Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, New
�York, Atheneum, 1990.
�Frank, Benis M., U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, History
�and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
�Washington, DC, 1987.
�*Friedman, Thomas L., From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York,
�Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1989.
�*Green, Stephen, Living by the Sword, Amana, 1988.
�*Jansen, Michael, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded
�Lebanon , London, Zed Press, 1982.
�MacBride, Sean, Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the
�International Commission to enquire into reported violations of
�international law by Israel during its invasion of Lebanon ,
�London, Ithaca Press, 1983.
�Ostrovsky, Victor and Claire Hoy, By Way of Deception, New
�York, St. Martin's Press, 1990.
�Peck, Juliana S., The Reagan Administration and the
�Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days , Washington,
�DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.
�*Randal, Jonathan, Going all the Way, New York, The Viking
�Press, 1983.
�Schechla, Joseph, The Iron Fist: Israel's Occupation of South
�Lebanon, 1982‑1985 , Washington, D.C.: ADC Research
�Institute, Issue Paper No. 17, 1985.
�*Schiff, Ze'ev and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, New York,
�Simon and Schuster, 1984.
�Timerman, Jacobo, The Longest War: Israel in Lebanon, New
�York, Vantage Books, 1982.
�Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981‑1987,
�New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.
�* Available through the AET Book Club.
�NOTES:
�1 New York Times, 3/18/83. For a detailed review of these
�clashes, see Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 177‑92, and Clyde
�Mark, "The Multinational Force in Lebanon," Congressional
�Research Service, 5/19/83.
�2 See "NBC Nightly News," 6:30 PM EST, 3/17/86; also, George
�C. Wilson, Washington Post, 2/5/83.
�3 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, p. 51; Cooley, Payback,
�pp. 69‑71.
�4 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 137.
�5 Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984 , Appendix F.
�6 New York Times, 10/1/82. Also see Cooley, Payback, p. 71;
�Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 175‑77
�7 The text is in New York Times, 9/30/82. Also see Peck, The
�Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, p. 76.
�8 Schiff & Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 225.
�9 "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," Journal of
�Palestine Studies, Summer/Fall 1982,
�p. 189.
�10 Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 178‑80.
�11 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, pp. 45‑46.
�12 Ibid.
�13 Green, Living by the Sword, p. 182.
�14 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 56.
�15 New York Times, 2/9/83; "Final Report of the Israeli
�Commission of Inquiry," Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring
�1983, pp. 89‑116.
�16 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 56.
�17 New York Times, 4/22/83 and 4/26/83. For more detail on
�CIA victims, see Charles R Babcock, Washington Post, 8/5/86,
�and Woodward, Veil, pp. 244‑45.
�18 Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, p. 321.
�19 Cooley, Payback, p. 76.
�20 New York Times, 8/30/83.
�21 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, pp. 75‑77.
�22 New York Times, 9/5/83.
�23 Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 489‑91; Friedman, From Beirut to
�Jerusalem, p. 179.
�24 New York Times, 9/6/83.
�25 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 505.
�26 New York Times, 9/14/83.
�27 New York Times , 9/13/83.
�28 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83.
�Also see Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, p. 335; Fisk, Pity the
�Nation, p. 505; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem , p. 210.
�29 Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 200‑01. Also see
�Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 190‑92.
�30 New York Times, 9/29/83.
�31 New York Times, 9/25/83; David Koff, "Chronology of the War
�in Lebanon, Sept.‑November, 1983," Journal of Palestine
�Studies, Winter 1984, pp. 133‑35.
�32 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83.
�Also see Cooley, Payback, pp. 80‑91; Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp.
�511‑22; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 201‑4;
�Woodward, Veil, pp. 285‑87.
�33 New York Times , 1/4/84; Cooley, Payback, pp. 95‑97.
�34 New York Times, 12/4/83.
�35 New York Times, 1/19/84. Also see New York Times,
�1/29/84, and Cooley, Payback, p. 75. For a chronology of
�attacks against Americans in this period, see the Atlanta
�Journal, 1/31/85.
�36 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533.
�37 New York Times, 4/16/84. Also see Cooley, Payback , p.
�111; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 565.
�38 Cooley, Payback, p. 102; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533;
�Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 220